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An empirical equilibrium job search model with wage posting is developed to
analyze the labor market impact of UK tax reforms. The model allows for a rich
characterization of the labor market, with hours responses, accurate representations
of the tax and transfer system, and both worker and ﬁrm heterogeneity. The model is
estimated with pre-reform longitudinal survey data using a semi-parametric estima-
tion technique, and the impact of actual tax reform policies is simulated. The model
predicts that the British Working Families’ Tax Credit and contemporaneous reforms
increased employment, with equilibrium effects found to play a relatively minor role.
Keywords: Labour market equilibrium, job search, wage dispersion, unemployment,
monopsony, incidence, tax credits
Over the past two decades earned income tax credit programs have grown substan-
tially in the UK, US and many other countries.1 These programs are typically motivated
by a desire from policy makers to increase labor market participation among target
groups, and to alleviate in-work poverty. While the effect of these policies on labor sup-
ply has been studied extensively, much less is known regarding the incidence of these
tax credit programs and their broader equilibrium impact.2 The objective of this paper
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2Exceptions include the recent studies by Azmat (2006), Leigh (2010), and Rothstein (2008, 2009).
1is to develop an empirical equilibrium job search model that provides us with an appro-
priate framework to address these issues, and to apply it in our analysis of a series of
UK tax reforms that included the Working Families’ Tax Credit (WFTC) reform, which
considerably increased the generosity of in-work support for families with children (see
Brewer, 2001).
This paper contributes to the literature on the impact of tax credit policies, but starts
from the premise that labor markets may be characterized by considerable search fric-
tions (see for example, van den Berg and Ridder, 2003). The presence of frictions may
have important implications for our understanding of programs like WFTC. In particu-
lar, if ﬁrms set wages then these frictions bestow them with some degree of monopsony
power. If labor supply were to increase following such reforms, ﬁrms may respond by
lowering wage offers, in which case the effective transfer to eligible families is reduced,
whilst non-eligible families may become worse off if they are competing within the same
labor market. In terms of both evaluation, and program design, an understanding of the
quantitative importance of these equilibrium effects is essential.
The equilibrium job search literature allows us to capture these and other effects in a
dynamic and imperfectly competitive economy that is characterized by search frictions.
Here it is the competition between ﬁrms that is the fundamental determinant of wages,
with the extent of this competition limited by the presence of search frictions. In the
spirit of Burdett and Mortensen (1998), we consider a model with ex-ante wage posting:
ﬁrms set wages before meeting potential workers, which workers then either accept or
reject.3 We advance this literature in several dimensions, with the model developed
here designed to reﬂect some key features of the UK labor market and to allow for the
possibility of rich equilibrium effects following reforms such as WFTC.
At a methodological level, this paper contributes to the empirical equilibrium search
literature by developing a wage-posting model with hours responses, accurate represen-
tations of the tax and transfer system, and both worker and ﬁrm heterogeneity. The
paper most closely related is the on-the-job search model presented in Bontemps, Robin
3Manning (2003) argues that while wage posting is not always appropriate, it provides a good charac-
terization of wage determination in many settings. This is likely to be particularly true when focusing on
low-skilled labor markets, as in this paper. Hall and Krueger (2008) present recent US survey evidence
which suggests that while other forms of wage formation are also important, wage posting is much more
prevalent in less skilled occupations (see also the discussion in Manning, 2003, chapter 5). Other papers
have examined the impact of similar policies with alternative forms of wage determination; Lise, Seitz and
Smith (2005) simulate the effect of a wide scale implementation of the Canadian Self-Sufﬁciency Project in
a model with ex-post worker-ﬁrm bargaining. They ﬁnd substantial equilibrium effects, which reverse the
positive cost-beneﬁt conclusions of their partial equilibrium evaluation.
2and van den Berg (1999), which this paper builds upon. As in their model, we allow
for continuous distributions of ﬁrm productivity and worker leisure ﬂows, but do not
impose the over-identifying restriction that the arrival rate of job offers is independent
of employment status.4 Furthermore, we endogenize these job offer arrival rates at the
macroeconomic level by complementing the model with aggregate matching functions.
As will become clear, allowing for heterogeneity in worker leisure ﬂows is important
as it provides the main mechanism through which tax reforms induce non-degenerate
labor supply responses.
As we describe in the following section, both WFTC and its predecessor were only
available to families with children. To investigate possible differential impacts to the
tax reforms, and to also explain differences in labor market outcomes, we incorporate
further dimensions of worker heterogeneity. Both the tax and transfer system, and the
key worker structural parameters, may all potentially vary with observable demographic
characteristics. In contrast to the segmented markets approach adopted by van den Berg
and Ridder (1998), we will allow workers of all types to operate within the same labor
market. It is this feature that allows workers who are not eligible for tax credits to be
indirectly affected by them through changes in the optimal strategies of ﬁrms.
The UK labor market has a high prevalence of part-time work, particularly among
women with children. As noted above, the presence of children is a central eligibility
requirement for receipt of tax credits. These features motivate us to incorporate hours
of work into the model. While the use of the canonical labor supply model may be
pervasive, there is a body of empirical work that challenges the view that individuals are
able to freely choose their hours of work at a ﬁxed hourly wage.5 That jobs sequentially
arrive as wage-hours packages is an assumption that will be maintained throughout this
paper. We do not attempt to provide micro-foundations for this, but rather assume it is
a purely technological characteristic of ﬁrms.
The level of generality here means that the model is analytically intractable. Nonethe-
less, we show that the model remains empirically tractable by developing a three step
semi-parametric estimation technique similar to that proposed by Bontemps, Robin and
4As we shall see in Section 2, this over-identifying restriction simpliﬁes the analysis as it implies that
the optimal strategy of unemployed workers is independent of the equilibrium wage offer distribution.
This restriction led to a poor ﬁt of the duration data in their application, as empirically job arrival rates
for unemployed workers are often estimated to exceed that of the employed.
5See, for example, Altonji and Paxson (1988). Blundell, Brewer and Francesconi (2008) studied the
impact of a series of in-work beneﬁt reforms in the UK during the 1990s, and found that the positive effect
on hours worked was largely driven by women who changed their job.
3van den Berg (1999, 2000), and then estimating the model using UK Labour Force Survey
data shortly before WFTC was introduced. Using the estimated structural parameters we
then simulate the impact of actual tax reforms. We ﬁnd that the introduction of WFTC,
together with the contemporaneous changes to the tax and transfer system, increased
employment for most groups, with single parents experiencing the largest employment
increase. Our main simulations suggest that while equilibrium considerations do play a
role in these reforms, the changes in labor market outcomes are dominated by the direct
effect of changing job acceptance behavior.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we describe
the WFTC reform, as well as the contemporaneous changes to the UK tax and transfer
system. In Section 2 we present the model and describe the optimal strategies of ﬁrms
and workers. Section 3 discusses identiﬁcation, describes the estimation procedure, and
presents the main estimation results. In Section 4 we then use the estimated model to
simulate the impact of actual tax reforms. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
1 UK Tax Credit Reform
As in the US, the UK has a long history of in-work beneﬁts, starting with the introduction
of Family Income Supplement in 1971. Over the years, these programs became more
generous, and in October 1999, Working Families’ Tax Credit was introduced, replacing
a similar but less generous tax credit program called Family Credit (FC). Both WFTC
and FC were only available to families with children and shared a similar eligibility
structure, requiring recipients work for at least 16 hours per week, and with the credit
tapered away with household earnings above a threshold. Both also offered a further
credit when recipients worked at least 30 hours a week. WFTC increased the level of
in-work support by offering higher credits, increasing the threshold so that families can
earn more before it was phased out, and by reducing the withdrawal rate.6 In Figure 1
we illustrate how this reform changed tax credit awards for a single parent family.
When analyzing low income support it is important to take an integrated view of the
tax system. This is because tax credit awards in the UK are counted as income when cal-
culating entitlements to other beneﬁts. Families in receipt of these beneﬁts would gain
less from WFTC than otherwise equivalent families not receiving such beneﬁts. There
6WFTC also provided more support for formal childcare costs and allowed all child maintenance pay-



















Figure 1: Tax Credit awards under FC and WFTC. FC refers to Family Credit as of April
1997. WFTC refers to Working Families Tax Credit as of April 2002. Figure assumes a
lone parent with a single child aged 10, and a constant hourly wage rate of £3.50. All
incomes expressed in pounds per week in April 1997 prices.
were also other important changes to the tax system affecting families with children that
coincided with the expansion of in-work tax credits, and which make the potential labor
market impact considerably more complex. In particular, there were increases in the
generosity of Child Beneﬁt (a cash beneﬁt available to all families with children regard-
less of income), as well as notable increases in the child additions in Income Support (a
welfare beneﬁt for low income families working less than 16 hours a week). There were
also other changes to the tax and transfer system that affected families both with and
without dependent children: a new 10% starting rate of income tax was introduced, the
basic rate of income tax was reduced from 23% to 22%, and there was a real rise in the
point at which National Insurance (payroll tax) becomes payable.7
2 The Model
We now describe the theoretical model that we use to study the impact of tax reforms. In
this model, the economy consists of a continuum of individuals with a population size
normalized to unity. Individuals ﬁrstly differ by their observable demographic charac-
teristics that are ﬁnite in number and indexed by i ≤ I. The fraction of such workers
7Our analysis does not consider the non-tax related changes that occurred during this period. Various
“New Deal” active labor market policies were introduced which aimed to improve both the incentives and
the ability of the long-term unemployed to obtain employment (see Blundell et al., 2004). Furthermore, a
national minimum wage was introduced (see Metcalf, 2008).
5is denoted ni with ∑i ni = 1. Individuals also differ in their unobserved leisure ﬂow b,
which includes any search costs but not unemployment beneﬁt and other transfers. The
cumulative distribution function of leisure ﬂows in the population of type i workers is
denoted Hi, which is assumed continuous on its support [bi,bi]. To simplify some of
the subsequent exposition we assume that bi is sufﬁciently low such that in equilibrium
all ﬁrms are active in the labor market. Time is continuous and individuals live forever
with the constant discount rate ρi > 0. There is no saving or borrowing technology.
Jobs are characterized by a wage rate w and required hours of work h. We allow
for part-time jobs (hours h0) and full-time jobs (hours h1 > h0), with workers subject
to a monetary hours disutility Ch
i .8 Mirroring the actual conditioning performed by the
UK tax authorities, the tax schedule is a function of demographics, hours, and earnings,
with Th
i (wh) denoting the potentially negative net taxes paid by an employed worker.
We assume that this tax schedule is continuously differentiable in labor earnings. The
net transfer paid to an unemployed worker is given by −Tu
i . Utility ﬂows are assumed
linear in income, so that in the presence of a tax and transfer system and hours responses
these are given by:
wh − Th




From the outset we impose the location normalization C0
i = 0 for all i ≤ I.
2.1 Worker Search
Individuals (or workers) are either employed or unemployed. Both search for jobs. Job
offer arrivals are exogenous to the worker: a type i worker accrues hours h offers at the
constant rate λh
ji with j ∈ {u,e} indexing the current worker state of unemployment or
employment. To maintain focus on the decision of workers, we postpone any discussion
concerning how these arrival rates may depend upon the overall state (or tightness)
of the labor market until Section 2.5.9 Employment spells end at rate δi regardless of
8The inclusion of work hours is rare in the empirical search literature (for an exception see, for example,
Blau, 1991). The analytical framework we develop generalizes to more than two hours choices, and can
also be applied in the context of other non-wage amenities. See also Hwang, Mortensen and Reed (1998)
for an analysis of non-wage amenities in an equilibrium search framework.
9We do not allow the search effort of workers to vary with their current wage or to respond to any
changes in the tax system. A more realistic approach would endogenize the job offer arrival rates at the
micro-level by relating them directly to an endogenously determined worker search effort, as in Chris-
tensen et al. (2005). Incorporating such responses is non-trivial and is left as an extension for future
research. See Gentry and Hubbard (2004) for US evidence on the impact of tax rates on job mobility.
6whether individuals are employed in part-time or full-time jobs, and we deﬁne κh
ji =
λh
ji/δi as the ratio of the arrival rates to this destruction rate.10 We place no restrictions
on the relative magnitude of these parameters, but note that the assumption that both
the job destruction rate and job offer arrival rates when employed are independent of
whether individuals are currently engaged in part-time or full-time work, is an over-
identifying restriction that simpliﬁes the subsequent analysis.
Regardless of their observed or unobserved type, workers sample sector h wages
from the wage offer distribution Fh which has support [wh,wh]. Wages are assumed
constant throughout an individual’s employment spell within a given ﬁrm and we ad-
ditionally deﬁne Fh ≡ 1 − Fh. For now, we treat these distributions as given and will
later describe how they emerge as an equilibrium outcome from the wage posting game.
The assumption that all workers sample offers from common distributions implies that,
while the government may be able to condition taxes and transfers on demographic char-
acteristics, ﬁrms are unable to do so. This assumption can be justiﬁed by the presence of
anti-discrimination laws, such as the Equal Pay Act 1970, Sex Discrimination Act 1975,
and various Employment Equality Regulations, which outlaw such practices.
2.2 Worker Strategies
We now describe the optimal strategies of unemployed and employed workers. To pro-
ceed we deﬁne qi(w) such that the value to a type i individual holding a full-time job
paying wage w is the same as the value of a part-time job paying wage qi(w). We refer
to this function as the indifference condition.
Proposition 1 The indifference condition qi(w) solves:
wh1 − T1
i (wh1) − C1
i = qi(w)h0 − T0
i (qi(w)h0). (1)
This function describes the wedge between the wages that an individual will accept
across hours sectors. For example, a full-time wage w worker will accept any full-time
offer that is (by convention, strictly) greater than w; they will also accept any part-time
offer (strictly) greater than qi(w). The proof of the proposition follows immediately from
the assumption that the job destruction rate and job offer arrival rates are independent
10As emphasized by van den Berg and Ridder (2003), the parameters κh
ei and κh
ui can be thought of as
labor market friction parameters. In particular, κh
ei is the number of sector h job offers a type i individual
can expect to receive when employed, before exiting to unemployment.
7of current hours; employed workers can do no better than maximize their instantaneous
utility ﬂow.11 Note that qi(w) has a unique solution provided that marginal tax rates
are strictly less than one for all w, conditional on hours of work. We maintain this
assumption throughout.
Unemployed workers follow a reservation wage strategy. Let φi(b) denote the low-
est acceptable wage for full-time work conditional on observed type i and unobserved
leisure ﬂow b. This takes a similar form to the standard reservation wage equation with
on-the-job search (see Mortensen and Neumann, 1988), but is here modiﬁed both by the
presence of taxes (which discount future earnings by the net-of-tax rate) and because
workers are sampling job offers from two distributions.
Proposition 2 The full-time reservation wage for unemployed workers φi(b) is the solution to
the following equation:
φi(b)h1 − T1
i (φi(b)h1) − C1






















The proof of this proposition is provided in the Supplementary Material. We immedi-
ately establish the following corollary.
Corollary 1 The part-time reservation wage for unemployed workers is given by qi(φi(b)).
Henceforth, we will refer to the full-time reservation wage for unemployed workers
simply as the reservation wage. Before proceeding we note that when job offer arrival
rates are independent of employment status, that is κh
ui = κh
ei, we have Bi(w) = 0 for all
w so that the optimal strategy of workers is independent of the equilibrium wage offer
distributions. This is the case analyzed in Bontemps, Robin and van den Berg (1999).
2.3 Steady-state Worker Flows
Having described the strategy of workers, we can derive a number of steady state condi-
tions that characterize the labor market. For now, we continue to treat the distributions
of wage offers and their arrival rates as being given.
11In the more general case where arrival rates and/or job destruction rates vary with current work
hours, the indifference condition will be a function of the distribution of wage offers in both sectors.
82.3.1 Distribution of Reservation Wages
Reservation wages summarize the optimal strategy of individuals. The cumulative dis-
tribution function of reservation wages amongst all type i workers (both employed and
unemployed) is denoted Ai and is related to the distribution of unobserved leisure ﬂows
according to Ai(w) = Hi(φ−1
i (w)). The respective distributions amongst the stock of
unemployed and employed workers are denoted Aui and Aei. These are related to Ai
according to:
Ai(w) = uiAui(w) + (1 − ui)Aei(w). (3)
The distribution of reservation wages amongst the unemployed Aui allows us to de-
scribe the ﬂows from the unemployment pool into employment at a given wage. As we
demonstrate shortly, it also allows us to determine the steady state unemployment rate.
In steady state the ﬂow of individuals with a reservation wage no greater than φ who
exit the employment pool following a job destruction shock must exactly equal the ﬂow
of such workers who enter employment. Hence,









By differentiating equation 4 using Leibniz’s rule we obtain a relationship between the
densities of employed and unemployed worker reservation wages, which when com-
bined with equation 3 allows us to establish the following proposition:
Proposition 3 The unemployment weighted distribution of reservation wages amongst type i







where Dui(φ) ≡ λ0
uiF0(qi(φ)) + λ1
uiF1(φ) is the rate at which a type i worker with reservation
wage φ will exit the unemployment pool into employment.
2.3.2 Between Jobs and the Distribution of Earnings
While individuals may sample wage offers from common distributions, the cross sec-
tional distribution of wages among the employed (earnings) will differ. For example,
some worker types may be more or less selective in the wages they will accept, or may
9gravitate to higher paying jobs at different rates. In what follows we denote the cumu-
lative distribution function of sector h earnings for type i individuals as Ghi with the
corresponding density functions ghi ≡ G′
hi. The fraction of such workers currently em-
ployed in an hours h job is denoted mhi and by construction we have m0i + m1i = 1− ui.
Rather than presenting ﬂow equations for each sector separately, here it is convenient
to deﬁne qhi(w) such that q0i(w) = qi(w) and q1i(w) = w. In steady-state, the number
of type i individuals who leave a sector h job paying wage qhi(w) (either by their job
being destroyed at rate δi or by gravitating to a higher value job) must exactly equal the
number of individuals who accept such a job (either from the unemployment pool or















is the rate at which such a worker will
exit their current job. Equation 6 feature a weighted distribution of full-time and part-
time earnings amongst the employed, m0iG0i(qi(w)) + m1iG1i(w), with the individual
distribution functions in this expression evaluated at wage rates that yield equal value
to the worker. And while expressions for G0i and G1i are both individually complicated,
this weighted distribution admits a considerably simpler form.
Proposition 4 The weighted distribution of earnings m0iG0i(qi(w)) + m1iG1i(w) may be writ-
ten as:
m0iG0i(qi(w)) + m1iG1i(w) =
Ai(w) − uiAui(w)[1 + Dui(w)/δi]
Dei(w)/δi
. (7)
A proof is provided in the Supplementary Material. Thus, we are able to use this propo-
sition to obtain expressions for the earnings densities (equation 6) in terms of the transi-
tional parameters, wage offer distributions, and distribution of reservation wages. These
may then be integrated to obtain the respective individual cumulative distribution func-
tions and employment shares.
2.3.3 Unemployment rate
The steady state unemployment rate balances the ﬂows from the unemployment pool to
employment, to the job destruction induced ﬂows from employment to unemployment.











+ 1 − Ai(ωi). (8)
where ωi ≡ min{w1,q−1
i (w0)} and ωi ≡ max{w1,q−1
i (w0)}.
This proposition follows immediately by letting φ → ∞ in equation 5. It decomposes the
unemployment rate into the contribution by three (endogenously determined) groups of
workers: those who accept all offers; those who accept some and reject others; and those
who reject all. Note that ui is bounded below by (1 + κ0
ui + κ1
ui)−1, which is the rate that
would prevail in the absence of any reservation wage heterogeneity. In contrast to the
homogeneous worker model κh
ei affects ui through two channels: the direct effect through
changes in worker reservation wages and the indirect effect through its potential impact
on the equilibrium wage offer distributions (described below).
2.4 Firms
In order to make this an equilibrium model we specify the behavior of ﬁrms. It is the
proﬁt maximizing behavior of ﬁrms, taking as given the optimal strategies of workers
and other ﬁrms, that determines the equilibrium distributions of wage offers and job
offer arrival rates. The type of job offer made by ﬁrms (full-time or part-time) is an
exogenous technological characteristic of the ﬁrm; we therefore refer to ﬁrms as belong-
ing to a particular hours sector.12 As in Burdett and Mortensen (1998) we assume that
there is wage posting: within each hours sector employers post a single wage w prior
to forming matches with potential employees, who can then either accept or reject the
offer. Firms also choose a level of recruiting intensity v which raises their visibility in
the labor market; the probability that workers draw job offers from a particular ﬁrm is
proportional to this recruiting intensity.
Within each sector, ﬁrms differ in their exogenously determined productivity. The cu-
mulative distribution of ﬁrm productivity in sector h is denoted Γh which is continuous
on its support [p
h, ph]. This productivity corresponds to the hourly ﬂow marginal prod-
uct of workers, and is independent of both the number and identity of workers. That is,
12We do however, allow the contact rate of ﬁrms to change differentially following tax reforms by
inclusion of a recruiting intensity decision. Alternative approaches such as allowing ﬁrms to substitute
between part-time and full-time workers (Roger and Roux, 2009), or choosing which sector to operate in
(Meghir, Narita and Robin, 2010) would complicate the analysis considerably.
11all workers are assumed equally productive at a given ﬁrm regardless of their observed
or unobserved type. The ﬂow cost of recruiting effort may also differ across ﬁrms. We
denote this as ch(v; p) with this function strictly convex in v and with ch(0; p) = 0.
2.4.1 Firm Size
The number of workers of a given observable type i that a sector h ﬁrm employs at wage
w and recruiting intensity v is denoted lhi(w,v). Since ﬁrms may potentially contact
workers of all types, total employment at such a ﬁrm is given by Lh(w,v) = ∑i nilhi(w,v).











which balance the number of workers who enter and exit employment at a given ﬁrm.
Note that lhi(w,v) is non-decreasing in w. This is because ﬁrms which pay higher wages
attract more workers from both the unemployment pool (the mechanism in Albrecht and
Axell, 1984) and lower value ﬁrms (the mechanism in Burdett and Mortensen, 1998). In





and with vh(p) denoting the recruiting policy of a sector h productivity p ﬁrm. Given
that the recruiting intensity v enters the RHS of equation 9 multiplicatively, it is con-
venient in what follows to write lhi(w,v) = lhi(w)v/Vh, and similarly deﬁne Lh(w) =
∑i nilhi(w). Substituting equation 7 into equation 9 we may eliminate the weighted
cross-sectional earnings distributions and establish the following result.
Proposition 6 Steady state employment levels in sector h for given wage w and recruiting












In contrast to models without reservation wage heterogeneity, the absence of on-the-
job search (κh
ei = 0) does not imply that employment is uniformly distributed across
ﬁrms when matching is random. This is intuitive because low wage ﬁrms are only
12able to attract low reservation wage workers (it is straightforward to show that lhi(w) is
proportional to Aui(w) in this case). More generally, ﬁrm size depends upon a weighted
distribution of reservation wages amongst employed and unemployed workers, with the
weights a function of job offer arrival rates and the distributions of wage offers.
2.4.2 Firm Proﬁts
Each ﬁrm chooses its wage policy wh(p) and recruiting policy vh(p) to maximize its
steady state proﬁt ﬂow,13 taking the arrival rate of job offers, together with the behavior






− ch(v; p) (12)
where πh(w; p) = (p − w)h   Lh(w) is the expected proﬁt ﬂow per unit intensity. The
optimal recruiting policy vh(p) equates the marginal cost of increasing recruiting effort
to the marginal expected proﬁt ﬂow. That is:
∂ch(v; p)
∂v








Maximized expected proﬁt ﬂow per unit intensity is given by πh(p) = πh(wh(p); p) =
(p − wh(p))h   Lh(wh(p)) so that π′
h(p) = Lh(wh(p)) by the Envelope Theorem. Since
Lh(w) is increasing in w, and wh(p) is increasing in p, it follows that the maximized
expected proﬁt ﬂow per unit intensity is a convex function of p. Rather than working
directly with the ﬁrst order conditions for the optimal wage policy of ﬁrms, we write











h − w)Lh(w) are the maximized proﬁts for the least productive
sector h ﬁrm. Setting equation 14 equal to (p − wh(p))hLh(p) we obtain the following
expression for the wage policy function:
13This is the standard assumption in the wage-posting literature. It assumes that ﬁrms have a zero rate
of time preference. See Mortensen (2000) for a discussion.
13Proposition 7 The optimal wage policy of ﬁrms wh(p) satisﬁes the following equation:
















which is a form that we exploit when we numerically solve for the equilibrium of our
model (see the Supplementary Material for details).
2.5 Matching Technology and Equilibrium
In order to close the model we endogenize the arrival rate of job offers by complementing
it with aggregate matching functions (see Mortensen, 2000). The total ﬂow of matches
in each hours sector h is denoted Mh(Vh,Sh); it depends on the total recruiting intensity











ji denotes the exogenous search effort of type i workers that is directed to sector
h when in state j ∈ {u,e}. By assumption, the matching function Mh is increasing in
both its arguments, concave, and linearly homogeneous. The job offer arrival rates for
each worker type are then related to the ﬂows of matches according to:
λh
ji = sh
ji   Mh(Vh,Sh)/Sh. (17)
The market equilibrium of the economy is now deﬁned in Deﬁnition 1.
Deﬁnition 1 A market equilibrium is deﬁned by {F0, F1,v0,v1} such that simultaneously:




ei}i≤I are given by equation 17.














with Vh as deﬁned in equation 10.
143. The strategy of each type i worker with leisure ﬂow b is to accept any full-time (part-time)
wage greater than φi(b) (respectively, φi(qi(b))) when unemployed; when employed in the
full-time (part-time) sector at wage w (respectively, qi(w)), the strategy is to accept any
full-time wage strictly greater than w and any part-time wage strictly greater than qi(w).
4. The strategy of each sector h productivity p ﬁrm is to choose a recruiting intensity vh(p)
and wage wh(p) that maximizes proﬁts given the job offer arrival rates, strategies of other
ﬁrms’ and workers’, as in equation 12.
3 Estimation
This section discusses the structural estimation of our model using longitudinal survey
data. We ﬁrst derive the likelihood function, and proceed to discuss identiﬁcation and
the estimation procedure. We then discuss our application of the UK tax and transfer
system and the data used in estimation. Results are presented in Section 3.6.
3.1 Likelihood Function
We derive the likelihood contribution for individuals in different initial labor market po-
sitions, and with different observed transitions. Note that we do not use any information
beyond the ﬁrst observed transition, and that the steady state distributions of earnings
and employment/unemployment shares have been used to determine the initial condi-
tions. The presentation closely follows that of Bontemps, Robin and van den Berg (1999).
In what follows elapsed and residual durations are given by:
tub = elapsed unemployment duration
tuf = residual unemployment duration
dub = 1 if unemployment duration left-censored, otherwise 0
duf = 1 if unemployment duration right-censored, otherwise 0
teb = elapsed employment duration
tef = residual employment duration
deb = 1 if employment duration left-censored, otherwise 0
def = 1 if employment duration right-censored, otherwise 0,
15while earned and accepted wages are denoted as follows:
wu = full-time wage accepted by unemployed individuals
qi(wu) = part-time wage accepted by unemployed individuals
du = 1 if wage accepted by unemployed is unobserved, otherwise 0
we = full-time wage of employees at date of ﬁrst interview
qi(we) = part-time wage of employees at date of ﬁrst interview
de = 1 if wage of employees is unobserved, otherwise 0.
Current employment is indexed by:
h0
e = 1 if employed work in the part-time sector, otherwise 0
h1
e = 1 if employed work in the full-time sector, otherwise 0,
and initial transitions are indexed by:
v0
u = 1 if unemployed accept a part-time job, otherwise 0
v1
u = 1 if unemployed accept a full-time job, otherwise 0
v0
e = 1 if employed accept a part-time job, otherwise 0
v1
e = 1 if employed accept a full-time job, otherwise 0.
3.1.1 Unemployed Workers
The exact form that the likelihood contribution for unemployed workers of type i will
take will depend upon whether unemployment durations are subject to any censoring
and the type of wage offer accepted, if observed. If unemployed workers are observed
to exit unemployment to a full-time job paying wu or a part-time job paying qi(wu), then

















16where we have integrated over the distribution of possible reservations wages given the
observed accepted wage rate using equation 5.
If we do not observe a wage accepted by the unemployed (du = 1), but we nonetheless
have dub + duf < 2, then it still must be the case that the full-time reservation wage of



















Finally, if we have both du = 1 and dub + duf = 2, then the individual is never observed
in the employment state so we must also consider the probability that such an individual










The likelihood contribution of a type i individual working full-time (part-time) at wage

























The likelihood function takes the same form for an employed worker whose wage is
unobserved (de = 1), except that we now integrate the above likelihood contribution
over the support of wages.
A common difﬁculty with the structural estimation of wage posting models is that
they do not permit job-to-job transitions associated with wage cuts. In the context of
the model developed here, wage cuts may be permitted if an individual changes hours
sectors, but reductions in the value of jobs are not.14 In the likelihood contribution for
14The model could potentially be extended to allow for job-to-job transitions associated with lower val-
ues by introducing a reallocation shock as in Jolivet, Postel-Vinay and Robin (2006). These shocks are draws
17employed workers (presented above) note that we do not use any information on the
wage accepted following a job-to-job transition. This partial information approach has
been adopted in a number of other empirical applications of wage posting models (see
for example, Kiefer and Neumann, 1993, and Bontemps, Robin and van den Berg, 1999).
An additional complication here is that the transition between hours sectors may also
be a zero probability event in some regions of the parameter space for some individu-
als. While there are a number of ways of potentially addressing this issue, we adopt a
simple approach by assuming that there is some small probability that the hours sector
following a job-to-job transition is observed with error.15
3.2 Identiﬁcation
To understand the separate identiﬁcation of the wage offer and reservation wage distri-
butions, it is useful to ﬁrst consider a special case of our model in the absence of hours
sectors, a tax system, and demographic heterogeneity, and where the distribution of
leisure ﬂows collapses to a degenerate distribution (i.e. workers are homogeneous). This
is the model analyzed in Bontemps, Robin and van den Berg (2000). Conditional on tran-
sitional parameters, identiﬁcation of the wage offer distribution follows directly from a
steady state relationship between the wage offer and earnings distributions. Moreover,
in such a setting all job offers will be accepted by all unemployed workers so that the
accepted wage distribution will coincide with the wage offer distribution. This special
case of our more general model is therefore over-identiﬁed.
Regardless of its source, once we allow for heterogeneity in the reservation wage
of unemployed workers the distribution of accepted wages will no longer equal the
wage offer distribution. This is because workers are selective in the wages that they are
willing to accept, so that the distribution of accepted wages (which will stochastically
dominate the wage offer distribution) will depend upon two distributions. We are still
able to establish non-parametric identiﬁcation in this case because we observe as many
from the wage offer distributions for which the only alternative to acceptance is to become unemployed.
The presence of reservation wage heterogeneity complicates the analysis as some individuals may wish to
exercise the unemployment option upon receiving such a shock.
15Alternatives approaches such as modeling the hours disutility as unobserved heterogeneity, or incor-
porating the measurement error through wages (as in van den Berg and Ridder, 1998) would complicate
the analysis considerably. In all the estimation results we ﬁx this transitional measurement error probabil-
ity to 5%, although our main results are not sensitive to this particular choice. We also note that conditional
on our maximum likelihood estimates, no transition across sectors observed in our data would actually
have zero probability. See Bound et al. (1994) for US evidence on measurement error in wages and hours.
18distributions (starting wages and cross-sectional earnings) as distributions that we wish
to recover. If we observe further distributions, such as the distribution of wages that the
employed receive in their next job, then we once again will have over-identiﬁcation.16
These ideas are presented more formally in the Supplementary Material, and are closely
related to the estimation procedure that we now present.
3.3 Three Step Estimation Procedure
The likelihood function depends directly upon the part-time and full-time wage offer
distributions, which themselves depend upon the exogenous distributions of ﬁrm pro-
ductivity and the other structural parameters of the model. Moreover, the conditional
earnings distributions, distribution of reservation wages, and the unemployment and
employment shares, are all complicated functions of these distributions and parameters.
Rather than attempting to solve the full model at each stage of the estimation, we instead
estimate the model using a three step procedure that is an extension of that proposed in
Bontemps, Robin and van den Berg (1999, 2000). Speciﬁcally:
1. We estimate {w0, w0} as the sample minimum and maximum values of we amongst
part-time jobs and {w1, w1} as the sample minimum and maximum values of we
amongst full-time jobs. None of these estimates condition upon worker type. We
then calculate estimates of the unconditional earnings densities in each sector using
non-parametric techniques. We denote these estimated densities as ˆ g0 and ˆ g1.17
2. We assume a parametric form for the distribution of unobserved leisure ﬂows Hi
with a ﬁnite parameter vector {θHi}i≤I. Since workers are assumed to sample
wages from the same wage offer distributions F0 and F1 regardless of their de-
mographic type i, we weight equation 6 by ni and sum across types to obtain





for h ∈ {0,1}. We replace the numerator of equation 19 by mh ˆ gh(w), where
mh = ∑i nimhi. To recover the part-time and full-time offer distributions that induce
16This is related to the approach taken by Barlevy (2008) and Barlevy and Nagaraja (2006) who using
record-value theory demonstrate identiﬁcation of the wage offer distribution by tracking the wage growth
of workers as a function of past mobility.
17In our empirical application we use Gaussian kernel estimators with a bandwidth of 0.5.
19our estimates of the unconditional empirical earnings distributions, we provide an
initial guess of f0 and f1 and then repeatedly (and simultaneously) iterate on this
equation for both h0 and h1, exploiting the conditional linearity seen above. At
each iteration step we scale the densities by a normalization factor to ensure that
we have proper distribution functions, and then verify that these normalization
factors converge to 1. Conditional on the transitional parameters and distributions
of leisure ﬂows, we obtain consistent estimates of the offer distributions and their
densities, which we respectively denote ˆ Fh and ˆ fh. These estimates are then substi-
tuted into the likelihood function. They are also used to calculate the conditional
employment shares and earnings densities: ui( ˆ F0, ˆ F1), mhi( ˆ F0, ˆ F1), and ghi( ; ˆ F0, ˆ F1).
3. Given a parametric form for the matching functions Mh(Vh,Sh) and the recruiting
cost functions ch(v; p) (we discuss our calibration of these in Section 4), we obtain
the implied distribution of ﬁrm productivity and recruiting efforts by rewriting the
ﬁrst order conditions from the ﬁrms’ maximization problem in each sector h as:
p = w−1
h (w) = w + Lh(w)/L
′
h(w), (20)




vh(p)/VhdΓh(p) from Deﬁnition 1. If the discount rate ρi is known, then the
distribution of leisure ﬂows Hi can then be recovered using equation 2.
We construct conﬁdence intervals by bootstrapping the three stage estimation pro-
cedure. The advantages of this multi step procedure versus a completely parametric
approach (whereby we specify the underlying distribution of ﬁrm productivity and then
solve for the equilibrium of the model) are essentially threefold. Firstly, it is consider-
ably easier to perform this numerical inversion than it is to solve the full model at every
evaluation of the likelihood function. Second, it permits greater ﬂexibility than simple
parametric forms for the productivity distribution. Thirdly, since this semi-parametric
estimation procedure does not require assumptions regarding the determination of Fh,
these estimates and those of the transitional parameters are valid under a range of pos-
sible models. Conversely, the main disadvantage of this approach compared to a com-
pletely parametric speciﬁcation, is that it does not guarantee a monotonically increasing
relationship between wages and productivity (in which case the empirical distribution
of wages can not be an equilibrium outcome from our model), and in general it may not
20be possible to constrain the structural parameters to achieve such monotonicity.18
3.4 Applying the UK Tax and Transfer System
Our empirical application seeks to accurately represent the main features of the UK tax
and transfer system so that we may consider the impact of a series of tax reforms. We do
not attempt to describe the full UK system here, but the interested reader may consult
Adam and Browne (2009) and Jin, Levell and Phillips (2010) for recent surveys. The
underlying tax and transfer schedules are calculated prior to estimation using FORTAX
(Shephard, 2009), and reﬂect the complex interactions between the tax and transfer sys-
tem, varying accurately with earnings, hours of work and demographic characteristics.19
To economize on the number of groups that we need to consider (and structural
parameters to estimate), we make a number of further assumptions regarding the set
of demographic types. Speciﬁcally, we do not allow taxes and transfers to vary by the
age of the claimant or by the age of any children. Taxes and transfers are calculated as
if the claimant were at least 25 years old, and as if any children are aged 10. Families
with more than two children are treated as if there were only two children. Since some
beneﬁts have asset tests, we also assume that no families in our sample are affected by
them. All families are assigned average band C council tax (a local property based tax).20
The model developed in Section 2 assumed the presence of a single economic deci-
sion maker. This presents difﬁculties for our empirical application because transfers and
in-work tax credits are assessed on family income in the UK. A complete treatment of
couples is beyond the scope of this paper (see Guler, Guvenen and Violante, 2009, for
a theoretical characterization of the reservation wage strategy of couples with income
pooling). Rather than providing a detailed characterization of the household decision
making process, we take an admittedly limited approach by conditioning upon the cur-
rent employment status and (discretized) earnings of the individuals’ partner. We then
18In principle we could estimate the model using data from both before and after the reforms, treating
each as a different steady state from the model. This would require solving the full model, as the model
imposes structure on the relationship between the distributions of wage offers and arrival rates across
steady states under different tax systems. It is also complicated by the non-tax changes over this period.
19A potentially important beneﬁt that we do not model is housing beneﬁt, a transfer given to low income
families to assist with housing rent. The Labour Force Survey data used in our empirical application does
not contain data on rents. Since tax credit income results in housing beneﬁt entitlement being withdrawn,
families in receipt of housing beneﬁt would gain less from WFTC than otherwise equivalent families. This
omission means that we are likely to overstate the initial labor supply response for some types.
20Band C is the most common band; the Labour Force Survey data does not report banding information.
21subsume partner earnings in the tax schedule, but allow this tax schedule to accurately
vary with the earnings of both individuals. In our empirical application we discretize
the empirical distribution of partner earnings (conditional on gender and the presence
and number of children) into ten groups, including non-employment (zero earnings);
actual partner earnings are then replaced with those observed at either the 10th, 20th,...,
or 90th percentile point of the relevant empirical distribution. When the earnings of an
individual’s partner is unobserved, we integrate the respective likelihood contribution
of individuals (see Section 3.1) over the corresponding distribution of partner earnings.
The above categorization requires that we consider I = 64 different worker types.
Conditional on hours of work, the resultant tax schedules for each of these groups as a
function of the wage rate will be a piecewise linear function, with possible discontinu-
ities. We ﬁrst remove these discontinuities by appropriately modifying parameters of the
tax and transfer system. The modiﬁed marginal tax rate schedule for ﬁxed hours is then
replaced by a differentiable function using the method proposed by MaCurdy, Green
and Paarsch (1990), which essentially smoothes the tax schedule in the neighborhood of
any marginal rate changes. Details are provided in the Supplementary Material.
3.5 Data
We estimate our model using a sub-sample of the UK Labour Force Survey (LFS). The
LFS is a quarterly survey of around 60,000 households in Great Britain, with these house-
holds followed for ﬁve successive quarters or “waves”. When individuals ﬁrst enter the
survey they are in wave one, so that in any given quarter, there are roughly equal pro-
portions of individuals in each interview wave. This rolling panel structure means that
there is approximately an 80% overlap in the samples for successive quarters.21
The LFS provides us with very rich information concerning the respondents labor
market status. Crucially, we observe employment status and spell durations, together
with hours and earnings information (in the ﬁrst and ﬁfth waves since 1997) for workers.
Our pre-reform estimation is performed using data before WFTC was introduced or
announced. We follow individuals who are observed in the ﬁrst quarter of 1997 until (at
the latest) the ﬁrst quarter of 1998. We calculate incomes and construct the likelihood
function as if individuals always faced the April 1997 system during this period so that
21The short panel dimension of the LFS is of some concern as relatively few transitions are observed.
While alternative panel data sets, such as the British Household Panel Survey, provide a more extensive
panel, the sample size is much smaller.
22the environment is stationary. While we may observe long elapsed spell durations, we
nonetheless impose left censoring for durations greater than 24 months as it is difﬁcult
to justify the assumption that they were generated from the same steady state.
We classify individuals as being employed if they have a job, and non-employed
if they do not. Since we do not distinguish between the states of unemployment and
non-participation, this deﬁnition of non-employment is broader than the standard ILO
unemployment deﬁnition. Amongst the employed, women who report working less
than 30 hours per week are classiﬁed as part-time workers, while those working at least
30 hours per week are classiﬁed as full-time workers. We set h0 = 20 and h1 = 40,
which correspond well to the respective conditional averages. Empirically, very few men
work part-time, so we treat all male workers as working full-time and set C1
i = 0. In
both cases, we calculate gross wages using reported hours of work, but then proceed to
calculate incomes as if they were working at the relevant discrete hours point.
Individuals who are aged below 21 or above 50 are excluded from our sample, as are
individuals in full-time education. We also exclude individuals when any adult family
member is either self-employed or long-term sick/disabled. Given the assumption that
workers are equally productive at a given ﬁrm, we additionally restrict our sample to
those individuals whose highest qualiﬁcation is O-level (or equivalent) or below, and
assume that any higher educated individuals operate in a separate labor market. After
sample selection we have roughly 24,000 observations. Summary statistics are presented
in the Supplementary Material.
While the tax and transfer schedules may vary with each observable type, we only al-
low the structural parameters of the model to depend on a subset of demographic types.
For couples we do not allow the parameters to vary with the earnings and labor market
status of their partner; for parents we do not allow them to vary with the number of
their children. The distribution of work opportunity costs Hi is assumed to be Normally
distributed, with mean µi and standard deviation σi.22
3.6 Estimation Results and Model Fit
Given our parameter estimates (Table 1), the implied wage policy functions w0(p) and
w1(p) that are obtained from the ﬁrst order conditions to the ﬁrms’ proﬁt maximization
problem (equation 20) are found to be monotonically increasing in p so that the esti-
22The leisure ﬂow distribution was poorly identiﬁed for single women. In the results presented we have
restricted the distribution of leisure ﬂows to be the same for married and single women without children.





ei µi σi C1
i
single men 90.1 – 13.6 – 21.5 6.5 64.4 –
[85.0,97.1] [11.0,16.7] [18.2,25.9] [-17.9,22.8] [43.9,89.7]
married men, no kids 171.4 – 4.4 – 16.1 -80.1 111.5 –
[154.5,188.1] [3.2,6.0] [13.7,19.5] [-149.1,-34.1] [81.7,155.1]
married men, kids 184.6 – 11.4 – 14.5 9.9 55.2 –
[171.6,198.8] [9.0,13.8] [12.2,17.6] [-13.5,27.5] [39.8,73.6]
single women 127.9 20.2 19.9 115.1 31.5 -73.6 107.6 18.9
[117.0,139.7] [15.7,25.7] [14.5,27.1] [64.3,282.1] [26.7,38.5] [-112.3,-45.4] [84.3,139.2] [8.8,27.9]
single parents 69.9 56.4 439.6 75.3 36.9 43.0 30.9 36.1
[65.2,76.4] [43.9,93.3] [263.6,1055.4] [55.7,102.3] [29.6,46.0] [29.8,48.9] [7.8,64.1] [32.9,39.3]
married women, no kids 157.0 22.9 16.6 109.8 51.9 -73.6 107.6 51.7
[144.8,168.8] [16.7,30.3] [12.2,23.0] [84.0,152.7] [43.4,65.9] [-112.3,-45.4] [84.3,139.2] [45.0,58.3]
married women, kids 102.6 24.1 127.5 35.2 84.2 32.5 48.5 42.1
[98.0,108.1] [20.3,28.8] [90.6,189.8] [30.9,40.8] [69.0,103.5] [27.2,36.5] [43.8,54.5] [34.0,50.5]
Notes: All durations are monthly. Incomes are measured in pounds per week in April 1997 prices. The distribution of work opportunity
costs Hi is assumed to be Normal, with mean µi and variance σ2
i . The 5th and 95th percentiles of the bootstrap distribution of parameter
estimates are presented in brackets, and are calculated using 500 bootstrap replications.
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4mated empirical distribution of wages can be an equilibrium outcome from our model.
That is, the theoretical model is not rejected by the data.23 These wage policy functions
are presented in Figure 2a. The ﬁrst notable feature evident in this ﬁgure is that the
wage policy functions become ﬂat as productivity increases so that high productivity
ﬁrms have a high degree of monopsony power. Second, the extent of monopsony power
is lower for part-time ﬁrms at high wages. When wages are high, the monetary disutil-
ity of work becomes small relative to earnings so that part-time ﬁrms must offer higher
wages if they are to attract workers from full-time jobs. The underlying distributions
of ﬁrm productivity are shown in Figure 2b, with both part-time and full-time distribu-
tions highly skewed to the right. The associated estimated wage offer distributions are
presented in Figure 2c, which shows that there is a relatively higher concentration of
low wage offers among part-time ﬁrms. Finally, the unconditional distribution of wage
earnings that these distributions induce is shown in Figure 2d.
The estimates suggest that there is considerable heterogeneity across groups. The
job destruction rate (which is relatively precisely estimated across all groups) is highest
for single parents (ˆ δi = 0.014) with this estimate implying that jobs are exogenously
destroyed on average every 70 months (= 1/0.014). The destruction rates are lowest
for married men and married women without dependent children, where they are es-
timated to be around two and a half times as small. The arrival rates of job offers also
varies considerably across groups. Job offers arrive most frequently for men: for unem-
ployed married men without children we obtain ˆ λ1
ui = 0.226, while for single men and
married men without children we obtain lower estimates (0.074 and 0.088 respectively).
Of course, not all these job offers will be acceptable to all workers. The estimated total
job offer arrival rates ˆ λ0
ui + ˆ λ1
ui for unemployed childless women is broadly similar to the
values of ˆ λ1
ui for men. However, for unemployed single parents and married women with
children we obtain much lower job offer arrival rates (particularly for full-time jobs).
For the majority of groups, the estimated job offer arrival rate when employed is
less than that when unemployed, although in some cases the estimated parameters are
very similar in value. For single men we obtain the relative arrival rate ratio ˆ λ1
ui/ˆ λ1
ei =
1.6, while this ratio is somewhat higher for married men without children (=3.6) and
slightly lower for married men with children (=1.3). In this latter case we can not reject
23Monotonicity is violated for a small proportion of the bootstrap samples. In order to construct boot-
strap conﬁdence intervals for the policy responses we therefore ﬁrst apply a rearrangement procedure
(see Chernozhukov, Fernandez-Val and Galichon, 2007). These violations are not a large concern as they






































































(d) Wage earnings distributions
Figure 2: Pre-reform equilibrium distributions and functions. All ﬁgures calculated us-
ing the maximum likelihood estimates from Table 1 and calculated under the April 1997
(pre-reform) tax and transfer system. All incomes measured in April 1997 prices. Figure
2a shows how the optimal wage policy of ﬁrms varies with hours and ﬁrm productivity,
and truncated at productivities greater than w
−1
1 ( ˆ G1(0.99)); Figure 2b shows the under-
lying distribution of ﬁrm productivity as obtained from the ﬁrst order conditions to the
ﬁrms’ proﬁt maximization problem (with the normalization vh(p) = 1), and truncated
at productivities greater than w
−1
1 ( ˆ G1(0.95)); Figure 2c shows the associated distribution
of part-time and full-time wage offers; Figure 2d shows the unconditional distribution
of part-time and full-time earnings that these wage offer distributions induce.
26the null hypothesis that the arrival rates are equal. These general ﬁndings are broadly
consistent with the estimates reported in van den Berg and Ridder (1998); they contrast
with Bontemps, Robin and van den Berg (2000) which found (using French Labour Force
Survey data) that job offers arrive around ten times as frequently for the unemployed
compared to the employed. For all groups of women we obtain the relative part-time
arrival rate ratio ˆ λ0
ei/ˆ λ0
ui < 1 (ranging from 1.3 for single parents to 5.7 for single women),
but we can not reject the null hypothesis that this ratio equals one for single parents.
Mirroring the pattern observed for men, the relative full-time job offer arrival rate ratio
for single women ˆ λ1
ei/ˆ λ1
ui = 1.6, while this ratio is again somewhat higher for married
women without children (=3.1) and lower for married women with children (=0.7). For
single parents we estimate large differences by employment status with ˆ λ1
ei/ˆ λui = 0.1.
The estimated monetary disutility of full-time work ˆ C1
i is lowest for single women
(around £19 per week in April 1997 prices), while it is at least twice as high for sin-
gle parents and married women. We obtain considerable dispersion in the unobserved
leisure ﬂows for all groups, and this translates into dispersion in reservation wages. In
the Supplementary Material we present results which show the proportion of workers
of each type whose reservation wage is below given percentiles of the (full-time) wage
offer distribution. In all cases we obtain ˆ Ai( ˆ w1) ≪ 1, so that workers are indeed selective
in the wage offers that they are willing to accept. This feature also implies a negative
duration dependence in the exit rate out of unemployment. Furthermore, we ﬁnd that
essentially all individuals would be willing to accept the highest full-time wage offer.
Since the wage offer distributions are common to all workers, any difference in em-
ployment states and earnings distributions must be explained by variation in the tran-
sitional parameters, leisure ﬂow distributions, and the tax and transfer system. Overall,
we obtain a good ﬁt to the data. The difference in the empirical and predicted states
for the main demographic groups is small and only rarely does it exceed 1 percentage
point (see Table 2). Similarly, we do well in replicating the observed distribution of wage
earnings (see Figure 3); for most groups the ﬁt is excellent, although the ﬁt of the full-
time earnings distribution for married women with children (Figure 3h) is somewhat
less satisfactory.
27Table 2: Empirical and Predicted Employment States
Empirical Predicted
ui m0i m1i ui m0i m1i
single men 0.251 – 0.749 0.241 – 0.759
[0.238,0.262] [0.738,0.762] [0.230,0.252] [0.748,0.770]
married men, no kids 0.070 – 0.930 0.063 – 0.937
[0.061,0.079] [0.921,0.939] [0.056,0.071] [0.929,0.944]
married men, kids 0.123 – 0.877 0.116 – 0.884
[0.114,0.131] [0.869,0.886] [0.110,0.123] [0.877,0.890]
single women 0.157 0.102 0.741 0.166 0.106 0.728
[0.144,0.170] [0.091,0.112] [0.726,0.757] [0.155,0.176] [0.096,0.116] [0.714,0.742]
single parents 0.601 0.229 0.170 0.594 0.238 0.167
[0.586,0.615] [0.216,0.242] [0.159,0.181] [0.580,0.609] [0.227,0.251] [0.156,0.179]
married women, no kids 0.130 0.224 0.646 0.131 0.228 0.641
[0.121,0.140] [0.213,0.237] [0.631,0.659] [0.123,0.142] [0.216,0.240] [0.628,0.654]
married women, kids 0.342 0.409 0.249 0.339 0.412 0.248
[0.332,0.351] [0.400,0.419] [0.240,0.258] [0.330,0.347] [0.403,0.423] [0.239,0.257]
Notes: Predicted states are calculated using the maximum likelihood estimates from Table 1. Employment states may not sum to one due
to rounding. The 5th and 95th percentiles of the bootstrap distribution of employment states are presented in brackets, and are calculated
using 500 bootstrap replications.
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(b) Married men, no kids





(c) Married men, kids

















(f) Married women, no kids












Figure 3: Simulated and empirical wage earnings by group. Horizontal axis refers to
hourly wage rate in April 1997 prices; Vertical axis refers to wage density. Empirical
distributions are calculated using a Gaussian kernel with a bandwidth of 0.5.
294 Simulating Tax Reforms
In this section we simulate the impact of real changes to the UK tax and transfer system
between April 1997 (the pre-reform sample period) and April 2002. All the simulations
in this section assume a quadratic recruiting cost technology ch(v; p) = ch(p)v2/2. Under
this speciﬁcation, the simulations are invariant to the parametrization of ch(p) provided
that ch(p) > 0 (see the Supplementary Material for a proof). Without loss of generality
we set vh(p) = 1 in the pre-reform period and recover the values of ch(p) that are
consistent with this being an equilibrium. This also implies that Γh(p) = Fh(wh(p))
under the base system. The simulations also assume the presence of Cobb-Douglas




h and we set θ0 = θ1 = 1/2. Given equilibrium
effects turn out to be small, our main results are not sensitive to these speciﬁc values.
To highlight the relative importance that these reforms have on job acceptance behav-
ior and the strategy of ﬁrms, we present our results in two stages. Firstly, we consider
the impact of the reforms holding the distribution of job offers and their arrival rates
constant; secondly, we additionally allow ﬁrms to optimally respond by changing their
wage policy and recruiting effort. We refer to the ﬁrst channel as the direct impact of the
reforms, and the second channel as the equilibrium impact of the reforms.
4.1 Direct Impact
The direct and equilibrium impact of the reforms on employment states is presented in
Table 3, and we ﬁrst discuss the direct effect. The table shows that the (non-WFTC) re-
forms had a small positive effect on the employment of both singles and couples without
children (ranging from 0.2 percentage points for married men without children, to 0.9
percentage points for single men). These increases are primarily due to small reductions
in the real value of out-of-work income, together with small reductions in income-tax
which act to raise the value of holding low wage jobs and so lower reservation wages.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the largest predicted impact of these reforms is on the em-
ployment rate of single parents, where we predict an increase of 5.6 percentage points.
Despite both full-time and part-time reservation wages falling for many of these work-
ers,24 this steady state employment increase is exclusively due to a movement into full-
24The reservation wages of individuals with very high b will actually increase. These individuals expe-
rience an increase in their out-of-work income, but at the high wages that these workers would actually
accept they will be ineligible for tax credits so there is little change in their net taxes when employed.
30Table 3: Employment Impact of Reforms
Direct Impact Equilibrium Impact
∆ui ∆m0i ∆m1i ∆ui ∆m0i ∆m1i
single men -0.009 – 0.009 -0.011 – 0.011
[-0.011,-0.007] [0.007,0.011] [-0.014,-0.009] [0.009,0.014]
married men, no kids -0.002 – 0.002 -0.003 – 0.003
[-0.002,-0.001] [0.001,0.002] [-0.004,-0.002] [0.002,0.004]
married men, kids -0.015 – 0.015 -0.015 – 0.015
[-0.020,-0.010] [0.010,0.020] [-0.021,-0.011] [0.011,0.021]
single women -0.005 -0.001 0.006 -0.006 -0.005 0.010
[-0.006,-0.004] [-0.002,0.000] [0.005,0.007] [-0.007,-0.005] [-0.007,-0.003] [0.008,0.013]
single parents -0.056 -0.017 0.073 -0.053 -0.022 0.075
[-0.073,-0.032] [-0.031,-0.007] [0.055,0.088] [-0.069,-0.030] [-0.037,-0.013] [0.057,0.091]
married women, no kids -0.004 -0.009 0.013 -0.004 -0.014 0.018
[-0.004,-0.003] [-0.010,-0.007] [0.011,0.014] [-0.005,-0.004] [-0.018,-0.011] [0.015,0.022]
married women, kids 0.013 -0.011 -0.002 0.015 -0.015 -0.000
[0.011,0.014] [-0.012,-0.009] [-0.003,-0.001] [0.014,0.018] [-0.019,-0.013] [-0.002,0.002]
Notes: All employment responses are expressed in percentage points. Changes may not sum to zero due to rounding. The direct impact
considers all changes to the tax and transfer system between April 1997 and April 2002, holding the wage offer distributions and arrival







































(b) Firms productivity distributions
Figure 4: Direct impact of tax reforms on single parents. Figure 4a shows the impact of
the reforms on the indifference condition for a single parent with two children (truncated
at full-time wages greater than £12); Figure 4b shows the direct effect of the reforms on
single parents’ distribution of wage earnings. All incomes measured in April 1997 prices.
time work. This is because the lower withdrawal rate of WFTC compared to FC results
in full-time incomes increasing by more than part-time incomes over a large range of
wages for this group (Figure 4a shows how the indifference condition qi(w) changes),
and because of on-the-job search with the estimated arrival rate of full-time wage offers
among the employed far exceeding that of part-time wage offers (λ1
ei ≫ λ0
ei).
For couples with children the impact of these reforms is more complicated as tax
credit entitlement depends upon family income: individuals with a high earning partner
are essentially unaffected by the reform; those with a non-working or very low earning
partner respond positively, much like single parents; in intermediate cases, movement
into work can result in tax credit awards being withdrawn which may induce negative
labor supply responses (particularly among the newly eligible families). On balance,
these factors lead to a small decrease in the employment of married women with children
(a 1.3 percentage point decrease), and increase the employment rate of married men
with children by a similar absolute magnitude. Among married women, this decrease
in labor supply comes primarily through a reduction in those working part-time. The
potential disincentive effects of tax credits programs on family labor supply have long
been recognized, with the direction of these responses consistent with those reported in
other studies (see for example, Eissa and Hoynes, 2004).
Before we discuss the equilibrium impact of the reforms, we brieﬂy discuss the effect
on wages. Note that selection alone imply that wage earnings will change even though
32the distribution of wage offers is held ﬁxed. This highlights the fact that attempting to
estimate the incidence of tax credit programs by comparing changes in observed wages
amongst eligible and non-eligible groups is potentially misleading without carefully con-
trolling for these dynamic selection effects. Indeed, selection alone implies some large
reductions in full-time average wages. Our simulations imply that single parents experi-
ence a 7% reduction in average full-time wage earnings and a 1% reduction in part-time
wages (see Figure 4b). The changes for other groups are much smaller.
4.2 Equilibrium Impact
In Table 3 we also present the equilibrium impact. The ﬁrst immediate thing to note
is that the impacts are generally very similar to those obtained from the direct impact.
That is, equilibrium considerations do not appear to be very important for this particular
set of reforms. Looking more closely we can see that equilibrium considerations tend to
increase employment in full-time jobs, and decrease employment in part-time jobs.
Given the small magnitude of the changes here, we do not attempt to describe the
responses in detail. We note, however, that the direction of the changes to ﬁrms’ optimal
policies can largely be understood by examining the initial direct impact of the reforms
on labor supply. The reduction in reservation wages experienced by many workers raises
both part-time and full-time employment at low wages. However, the changes to the
indifference conditions as noted above also induce transitions between the hours sectors.
The net effect of these transitions means that part-time employment falls at moderate
wage levels. Part-time ﬁrms which experienced initial increases in their employment
generally respond by lowering their wage offers in the new equilibrium and increasing
their recruiting intensity; at slightly higher wage rates where employment initially falls
we ﬁnd the opposite effect. Full-time ﬁrms have smaller adjustments in their wages
(although it is still the case that the ﬁrms which experienced the largest initial increase
in employment tend to have the greatest reduction in wages), with the majority of the
response for these ﬁrms coming through changes in recruiting intensity. In Figure 5 we
illustrate these relative change in ﬁrms’ strategies.
4.3 Other Evaluations
The set of tax reforms considered here have been the subject of a number of other studies,












































































































(d) Full-time wage policy
Figure 5: Equilibrium policy responses. Figures 5a and 5c show how the equilibrium re-
cruiting intensity of part-time and full-time ﬁrms (as identiﬁed by their pre-reform wage
policy) changes, and how this compares to the relative direct employment responses.
Similarly, Figures 5b and 5d show how the equilibrium wage policy of part-time and
full-time ﬁrms changes, and again compares this to the relative direct employment re-
sponses. All incomes measured in April 1997 prices.
34and Browne, 2006, for a survey). These evaluations have largely (but not exclusively)
focused upon the impact on single parents and essentially involve comparing the chang-
ing employment outcomes of single mothers to single women without children. The
quantitative impact reported in these studies is remarkably similar to those in Table 3.
This is perhaps unsurprising given that we did not ﬁnd evidence of strong equilibrium
effects in our analysis (if they were important then the usual stable unit treatment value
assumption would be violated). The employment impact is also similar to that reported
in studies using discrete choice techniques (for example, Blundell and Shephard, 2011).
4.4 Post-reform Comparison
We now compare our results to the actual changes to employment states between 1997
and 2002 – tabulations are presented in the Supplementary Material. Over this period, all
the broad demographic groups experienced an increase in their employment rate. And
for all groups except single men and married women with children, we systematically
under-predict the growth in employment by between around one and one-and-a-half
percentage points. For single men and particularly married women with children, the
extent of under-prediction is larger. Overall, this suggests that non-tax changes over
this period, including robust productivity growth, changes in the distribution of partner
earnings, the introduction of a national minimum wage, and various “New Deal” active
labor market policies (particularly relevant for low skilled men) were also important for
understanding the changing labor market outcomes. Finally, we note that the model is
somewhat less successful in explaining the changing distribution of work hours. For
single parents, the empirical increase in employment is evenly split between movements
into both part-time and full-time employment; this contrasts with our simulations which
suggested that it was exclusively due to a movement into full-time work.
4.5 Why Aren’t Equilibrium Effects More Important?
Our analysis suggests that equilibrium effects may be small. We now explore the extent
to which this may be due to the integrated nature of the labor market and the targeted
nature of the reforms. While allowing all workers to compete within the same market
was a natural characterization of the labor market, and one which permitted spillover
effects, it limits the potential for sizable equilibrium effects following a targeted reform
35like WFTC if ﬁrms are constrained to have a single wage policy.25 To understand the
importance of these assumptions we now consider – for illustrative purposes – a labor
market comprised of single parents and married men with children. These were the two
groups with the largest simulated employment response.26 Under this assumption we
obtain larger within-market equilibrium effects. There are now larger changes in the
optimal policies of ﬁrms (particularly in the part-time sector) which result in a reduced
employment response for single parents: equilibrium considerations now reduce the
employment increase to 4.5 percentage points (the direct impact is reduced by 22%).
Equilibrium responses, as before, act to slightly increase employment for married men
with children. However, there is little additional impact relative to the results reported
in Table 3 as the change in policy responses is concentrated among part-time ﬁrms.
5 Conclusion
This paper has developed an empirical equilibrium job search model with wage posting,
and has used it to analyze the impact of a series of UK tax reforms that included the
Working Families’ Tax Credit reform. It presents a synthesis of existing equilibrium job
search models, and extends them in a number of dimensions to reﬂect key features of
the UK labor market and to allow for the possibility of rich equilibrium effects.
We structurally estimate the model using a semi-parametric estimation procedure,
and predict that the tax reforms had a positive effect on the employment of most groups,
with single parents experiencing the largest employment increase. Our simulations sug-
gest that while equilibrium effects do play a role, the changes in labor market outcomes
are dominated by the direct effect of changing job acceptance behavior. And while these
reforms appear to be able to explain some of the actual changes in employment over the
relevant period, for some groups other changes in the economy appear more important.
Even though these equilibrium effects may not appear very large for this particular
set of reforms, it does not imply that they should always be ignored. Recalling that
WFTC is only available to families with children, these equilibrium effects have the
25In a model with worker and ﬁrm bargaining, wages essentially become individualistic so that the
potential for equilibrium effects is much larger. Lise, Seitz and Smith (2005) used such a model in their
analysis of the Canadian Self-Sufﬁciency Project, and found substantial equilibrium effects.
26To ensure that the direct impacts remain as in Table 3 we do not re-estimate the model. Instead, we
use the same parameter estimates from Table 1 (with the associated non-parametric estimates of Fh), and
recover the distribution of ﬁrm productivity under alternative market segmentation assumptions. We also
attempted this exercise using a market comprised solely of single parents, but encountered large mono-
tonicity violations when using ﬁrms’ ﬁrst order conditions to recover the distributions of productivity.
36potential to be more important for reforms that are less targeted. We also demonstrate
that the within market equilibrium effects of the same reforms may be much larger if we
consider a somewhat more segmented labor market.
We believe that this paper represents an important step in using empirical equilib-
rium job search models to evaluate the impact of tax policies. Despite performing our
empirical analysis on individuals with low education levels, it is likely that differences
in worker ability persist. A natural extension could therefore involve incorporating het-
erogeneity in worker productivity which necessitates a more detailed modeling of ﬁrm
production technologies. Furthermore, given that the tax and transfer systems of many
countries depend upon family income to some extent, a more detailed characterization
of the behavior of couples would allow us to explore the impact of policies on household
labor supply allocations. Finally, given the importance of labor supply in our simula-
tions, incorporating a micro-level search intensity choice would create a further dimen-
sion along which individuals can respond. While each of these represent non-trivial
extensions, it does suggest a very exciting agenda of future research.
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40Online Supplement to “Equilibrium Search and
Tax Credit Reform”
These online appendices (i) present some additional descriptive and results tables,
(ii) provide proposition proofs, (iii) describe the tax rate schedule smoothing, and (iv)
outline the numerical algorithm used to solve the model.
A Additional Parameter and Results Table
In Table S1 we present some data summary statistics; in Table S2 we present results
which show the proportion of workers of each type whose reservation wage is below
given percentiles of the (full-time) wage offer distribution, as described in Section 3.6
from the main text; in Table S3 we compare the predicted changes from the model to the
actual changes based on our sample selection criteria, and as discussed in Section 4.4
from the main text.
B Proof of Proposition 2
In this appendix we derive the optimal reservation wage strategies of unemployed work-
ers that were presented in Section 2.2 from the main text. For notational simplicity, we do
not explicitly write the value functions or the resultant reservation wages as a function
of the unobserved leisure ﬂow b. The value of unemployment Vui must satisfy:
















ei(w) are the values of part-time and full-time employment when re-
ceiving wage w, and where Ew∼Fh indicates that the expectation is taken over the random
variable w with cumulative distribution function Fh. For workers who are employed in
a part-time job (h = h0) we have:
ρiV0
ei(w) = wh0 − T0














+ δi(Vui − V0
ei(w))
41Table S1: Descriptive Statistics
Unemployed Employed
#Nu u → h0 u → h1 #wu #N0
e #N1
e e → h0 e → h1 e → u #w0
e #w1
e
single men 796 – 149 59 – 2372 – 96 98 – 1341
married men, no kids 132 – 36 16 – 1763 – 74 29 – 1223
married men, kids 504 – 99 57 – 3602 – 134 97 – 2472
single women 357 26 33 38 233 1685 13 63 52 135 1054
single parents 1661 100 12 89 630 467 28 18 65 421 325
married women, no kids 417 25 22 28 720 2076 23 74 87 541 1481
married women, kids 2176 204 42 154 2594 1583 91 55 180 1953 1168
Notes: #Nu refers to the number of unemployed observations in a given category; #N0
e and #N1
e respectively refer to the number of part-time
and full-time employment observations. #wu refers to the number of observed accepted wages from unemployment; #w0
e and #w1
e refer to
the number of cross-sectional wage observations in part-time and full-time employment. i → j refers to the numbers of observed transitions




Part-time wages Full-time wages
P10 P25 P50 P75 P90 mean SD P10 P25 P50 P75 P90 mean SD
single men – – – – – – – 3.41 4.15 5.35 7.02 9.35 5.93 2.61
married men, no kids – – – – – – – 4.05 5.00 6.48 8.45 11.28 7.14 3.06
married men, kids – – – – – – – 3.93 5.05 6.67 8.98 11.82 7.33 3.17
single women 2.74 3.18 3.84 4.93 6.09 4.32 1.88 3.31 4.03 5.22 7.06 9.26 5.83 2.53
single parents 2.63 3.24 3.78 4.79 6.13 4.16 1.50 3.56 4.18 5.44 7.03 9.26 5.91 2.41
married women, no kids 2.99 3.51 4.11 5.12 6.57 4.56 1.75 3.44 4.23 5.40 6.98 8.88 5.84 2.33
married women, kids 2.94 3.47 4.19 5.47 6.83 4.65 1.79 3.44 4.19 5.45 6.80 8.69 5.83 2.30
Notes: All wages are hourly and are expressed in April 1997 prices. P10, P25, P50, P75, and P90 respectively refer to the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th,
and 90th percentiles of the cross-sectional hourly wage distribution; SD refers to the standard deviation.
4
3Table S2: Reservation Wage Distribution
Percentile of full-time wage offer distribution
5 20 40 60 80 95
single men 0.300 0.444 0.586 0.723 0.877 0.989
[0.186,0.464] [0.328,0.577] [0.490,0.687] [0.657,0.795] [0.835,0.930] [0.969,0.999]
married men, no kids 0.186 0.367 0.561 0.728 0.886 0.985
[0.104,0.351] [0.248,0.524] [0.445,0.688] [0.640,0.812] [0.839,0.926] [0.972,0.993]
married men, kids 0.559 0.668 0.747 0.809 0.882 0.977
[0.434,0.656] [0.566,0.738] [0.672,0.799] [0.758,0.847] [0.854,0.904] [0.968,0.986]
single women 0.551 0.671 0.757 0.825 0.899 0.974
[0.416,0.665] [0.563,0.751] [0.680,0.813] [0.775,0.866] [0.867,0.927] [0.957,0.987]
single parents 0.400 0.526 0.606 0.664 0.748 0.971
[0.209,0.552] [0.439,0.668] [0.535,0.849] [0.592,0.938] [0.661,0.992] [0.860,1.000]
married women, no kids 0.293 0.488 0.665 0.793 0.899 0.977
[0.158,0.488] [0.344,0.646] [0.560,0.766] [0.730,0.850] [0.870,0.924] [0.964,0.986]
married women, kids 0.291 0.464 0.623 0.747 0.865 0.966
[0.233,0.389] [0.387,0.561] [0.544,0.702] [0.680,0.809] [0.823,0.900] [0.951,0.978]
Notes: Table shows the fraction of individuals whose full-time reservation wage is below various percentiles p of the full-time wage offer
distribution, Ai( ˆ F−1
1 (p)), and is calculated using the maximum likelihood estimates from Table 1. The 5th and 95th percentiles of the
bootstrap distribution are presented in brackets, and are calculated using 500 replications.
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4Table S3: Post-reform Comparison
Empirical Predicted
∆ui ∆m0i ∆m1i ∆ui ∆m0i ∆m1i
single men -0.050 – 0.050 -0.011 – 0.011
married men, no kids -0.019 – 0.019 -0.003 – 0.003
married men, kids -0.031 – 0.031 -0.015 – 0.015
single women -0.018 0.005 0.012 -0.006 -0.005 0.010
single parents -0.065 0.031 0.034 -0.053 -0.022 0.075
married women, no kids -0.023 -0.012 0.035 -0.004 -0.014 0.018
married women, kids -0.034 0.007 0.028 0.015 -0.015 -0.000
Notes: All employment responses are expressed in percentage points. Changes may not sum to zero
due to rounding. The direct impact considers all changes to the tax and transfer system between April
1997 and April 2002, holding the wage offer distributions and arrival rates at their pre-reform levels. The
equilibrium impact allows the wage offer distribution and arrival rates to change.
and for workers employed in a full-time job (h = h1):
ρiV1
ei(w) = wh1 − T1















+ δi(Vui − V1
ei(w)).
Recalling that qi(w) is deﬁned such that V1
ei(w) = V0
ei(qi(w)), it follows that the value of
a full-time job at wage w may be written as:
ρiV1
ei(w) = wh1 − T1














ei(w))dF1(x) + δi(Vui − V1
ei(w)).
(S2)
Equating equation S2 (evaluated at wage w) with the analogous expression for part-time
employment (evaluated at wage qi(w)) implies that qi(w) is the solution to:
wh1 − T1
i (wh1) − C1
i = qi(w)h0 − T0
i (qi(w)h0) (S3)
which is equation 1 from the main text. We obtain this simple expression because, con-
ditional on being in employment, both the destruction rate and arrival rates for full-time
and part-time jobs are assumed independent of work hours so that it is only necessary













To calculate the reservation wage we proceed by ﬁrst performing integration by parts on
equation S2 to obtain:
ρiV1
ei(w) = wh1 − T1












ei(x) + δi(Vui − V1
ei(w)) (S4)
which when differentiated with respect to w yields:
h1(1 − T1
i






We denote φi as the lowest acceptable wage offer for full-time work. Since Vui = V1
ei(φi) =
V0
ei(qi(φi)), the lowest acceptable wage offer for part-time work is then qi(φi). Using this,
we can write equation S1 as:
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above:
























46By deﬁnition of the reservation wage we can set the above equal to ρiV1
ei(φi) (from equa-
tion S2) to obtain the following implicit equation deﬁning φi:
φih1 − T1
i (φih1) − C1


























Dividing both the numerator and denominator of the integral terms by δi, and perform-
ing a simple change of variable, we then obtain the simpliﬁed expression presented in
equation 2 in the main text.
C Proof of Proposition 4
The number of individuals who exit either a full-time job paying a wage no-greater than
w or a part-time job paying wage no-greater than qi(w) must exactly equal the number
of individuals who exit the unemployment pool to receive such wages. That is:









(F1(w) − F1(x))dAui(x). (S6)

















or equivalently by using equations 3 and 4 from the main text as,
δiAi(w) − uiAui(w)[δi + Dui(w)] . (S7)
Setting equation S7 equal to the LHS of equation S6 and rearranging terms, we then
obtain the form presented in equation 7 from the main text.
47D Identiﬁcation
In Section 3.2 we discussed the identiﬁcation of our model, and we now illustrate these
ideas more formally. Here we set out to show that conditional on the set of transi-
tional parameters, the observed distributions of part-time and full-time wages, together
with the distributions of wages accepted by the unemployed are sufﬁcient to separately
identify the wage offer and reservation wage distributions. Once these are known, the
structure of the model then permits identiﬁcation of the opportunity cost and produc-
tivity distributions. In what follows, we let GU
1i and GU
0i denote the respective cumulative
distribution functions of wages ﬁrst accepted by type i unemployed workers in full-time
and part-time jobs. Since individuals will accept any wage offer that is at least as high
as their reservation wage, GU











= Aui(w) − F1(w)







Similarly the fraction of part-time jobs accepted that pay no more than qi(w) can be
shown to be given by:
GU
0i(qi(w)) = Aui(w) − F0(qi(w))











′ we can write:













which therefore demonstrates that the distribution of reservation wages amongst the
unemployed on support [ωi,ωi] is identiﬁed given knowledge of the wage offer functions
F0 and F1. The monetary disutility of full-time work C1
i is identiﬁed by observing how
the job-to-job transitions across hours sectors varies with the current wage rate.
48Substituting equations S8 and S9 into equation 6 from the main text, we can elim-
inate the unobserved reservation wage distribution to obtain the following differential
equations governing the evolution of the two wage offer distributions:
F′
1(w) = m1ig1i(w)R1
i (w; F0, F1) (S10)
F′
0(qi(w)) = m0ig0i(qi(w))R0
i (w; F0, F1) (S11)
where:
R1












ei (m0iG0i(qi(w)) + m1iG1i(w))
and:
R0












ei (m0iG0i(qi(w)) + m1iG1i(w))
.
Equations S10 and S11 deﬁne a system of differential equations, which together with
the initial conditions F1(ωi) = 0 and F0(qi(ωi)) = 0, establishes non-parametric identi-
ﬁcation of both wage offer functions conditional on the set of transitional parameters.
Identiﬁcation of the underlying opportunity cost distribution and the productivity dis-
tributions then follows as described in Section 3.3.
E Tax Schedule Smoothing
Conditional on hours of work h, we remove small discontinuities in the budget con-
straint by setting the minimum transfer amount to zero for all beneﬁts. We also remove
the National Insurance (payroll tax) entry fee that existed prior to April 1999. With K
tax brackets, the marginal tax rate approximation at hours h and earnings wh for an











i,k is the marginal tax rate at the kth bracket and Φh
i,k is the normal cumulative
distribution function with a mean equal to the value of the kth tax bracket and with
standard deviation σh
i,k. The value of σh
i,k determines how quickly the smoothed marginal
tax rates MTRh
i change in the neighborhood of the break points, with a small value
49ﬁtting the underlying step function more closely. We set σh
i,k = 20 (measured in pounds
per week in April 1997 prices) which produces a relatively smooth tax schedule, but our
results are not sensitive to this choice.
F Numerical Algorithm
We now sketch the algorithm that we use to solve for the steady state equilibrium:
1. We ﬁrst provide an initial guess of the recruiting policy functions vh(p) and un-
employment shares ui to obtain the total recruiting intensity Vh and total search
intensity Sh. Given a parametrization of the matching functions, we can use equa-
tion 17 from the main text to obtain a set of arrival rates λh
ji.
2. Conditional upon the guesses from step 1, we solve for the optimal wage policy of
ﬁrms wh(p). To do this we ﬁrst provide an initial guess of the wage policy functions
(with wh(p) < p strictly increasing in p), and using the relationship between the
(weighted) distribution of ﬁrm productivity and wage offers in equation 18, solve
for the steady state of the labor market using the ﬂow equations presented in
Section 2 from the main text. To obtain an update of π∗
h(p
h) we calculate ˜ wh =
argmax w(p
h − w)Lh(w) and then set π∗
h(p
h) = (p
h − ˜ wh)Lh(w). We then obtain an
update of the wage policy functions by using equation 15 from the main text. We
continue to iterate until (conditional on our guess of the recruiting policy functions
and arrival rates) the wage policy functions of both part-time and full-time ﬁrms
converge.
3. Given the wage policy functions from step 2, we update our guess of the recruiting
policy functions by using equation 13 from the main text. We then return to step
1 above, with these updated recruiting policy functions (together with the implied
unemployment rates ui from step 2) replacing our initial guesses. We keep repeat-
ing this iterative procedure until the recruiting policy functions of both part-time
and full-time ﬁrms has converged.
G Proof of Reform Invariance to Parametrization of ch(p)
Under the assumption that ch(p,v) = ch(p)v2, the equilibrium of the model is invariant
to the parametrization of ch(p) provided that ch(p) > 0 for all p. To understand this
50invariance result let us consider the pair of recruiting cost functions ch(p) and ˜ ch(p) for
h ∈ {0,1}. In each case, we recover the distribution of ﬁrm productivity and underlying
search intensities such that under the base system we induce the estimated set of arrival
rates and wage offer distributions. To demonstrate this result, we show that given a set
of job offer arrival rates the optimal choice of wage policy functions and distribution
of wage offers are the same. We then show that given the optimal choice of recruiting
intensity, both cost functions generate the same equilibrium job offer arrival rates.
First note that in order to induce the same distributions of wage offers under the base
system, the distributions of ﬁrm productivity under the alternative cost function must
satisfy:
˜ γh(p) =





In equation S12 and in what follows, we denote objects under the alternative cost func-
tion ˜ ch(p) with a tilde. Similarly, Vh,b and ˜ Vh,b are used to denote the respective aggregate
recruiting intensities under the base systems.
We now demonstrate that we obtain the same distribution of wage offers following




˜ ch(p) ˜ Vh
. (S13)
This recruiting policy function is consistent with the same expected proﬁt ﬂow per unit
intensity under the alternative cost functions (see equation 13 from the main text). This
choice of recruiting policy also induces the same wage offer distributions. Using equa-

















˜ Vh/ ˜ Vh,b































so that the aggregate recruiting intensity ratio in the reform and base systems is the







Finally, we verify that the set of job offer arrival rates are the same by showing that the
set of search intensities that would induce these arrival rates do not change between the









and that if the set of arrival rates are the same then so is the ﬂow of matches. Thus, we












From equation S15 we know that Vh/ ˜ Vh = Vh,b/ ˜ Vh,b so that there is no change in this
ratio between the base and reform systems.
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